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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In June 2009, the Association of Irritated Residents and other California 
environmental justice groups brought the first of several environmental 
justice lawsuits against California’s climate change program. The lawsuits 
were intensely controversial, not only to the state regulators struggling to 
launch the nation’s most comprehensive and far-reaching climate change 
program, but to the mainstream environmental community who believed 
that the lawsuits would frustrate sorely needed and hard-fought progress 
in climate regulation.  The lawsuits could have two possible legacies: 
greater division and resentment between mainstream environmental and 
environmental justice constituencies, or—whatever the perceived merits 
and drawbacks to the decision to sue—a greater and broader awareness of the 
environmental justice community’s substantive concerns. 
This essay does not debate the political wisdom of suing; instead, it 
takes the suits as a given and attempts to enhance understanding of the 
environmental justice community’s climate justice agenda.  It describes 
the role of environmental justice in the development of California’s climate 
law, AB 32, describes the lawsuits, and suggests some of the larger lessons 
about climate policy, cap-and-trade, and environmental justice that these 
lawsuits reveal.  Ultimately, the environmental justice lawsuits highlight 
two primary themes: (1) the importance of a holistic approach to climate 
change policy that recognizes and integrates its multiple dimensions, 
including co-pollutant implications; and (2) more specifically, and moving 
beyond traditional environmental justice claims, the potential weaknesses 
and risks of cap-and-trade as a climate policy tool.  The essay does not 
claim to resolve these complex policy debates.  Nor does the essay focus 
on my own views on cap-and-trade and environmental justice (though 
these views inevitably inform the analysis to some degree).  Instead, the 
essay’s goal is to provide perspective on the lawsuits and set the stage for 
a constructive path forward. 
A starting premise is that climate policies have multiple environmental 
justice implications, including the environmental and economic impacts 
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of both climate mitigation and climate adaptation strategies.1  Like the 
lawsuits, this essay focuses on the environmental implications of climate 
mitigation policies, implications which arise from the strong correlation 
between greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and co-pollutants.2  Most GHGs 
result from combustion, and those combustion processes generate not only 
GHGs, but criteria pollutants (like nitrogen oxides and particulates) and 
toxic pollutants.  So, indirectly, climate policies to control GHGs are likely 
to have significant consequences for traditional pollutants, and hold 
significant promise in terms of potential pollution reduction co-benefits. 
II.  BACKDROP: AB 32 AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
A.  The Role of Environmental Justice in the Genesis of AB 32 
AB 32’s legislative history casts light on the environmental justice 
community’s expectations about and their ultimate disappointment in AB 
32’s implementation.  California enacted the Global Warming Solutions 
Act, commonly referred to as “AB 32,” in 2006.3  AB 32 establishes the 
goal of reducing state emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, a reduction 
estimated to achieve a fifteen percent reduction from 2005 emissions.4  
 
 1.  Economic justice impacts include the cost of reducing emissions on low-income 
consumers.  See Daniel A. Farber, Pollution Markets and Social Equity: Analyzing the 
Fairness of Cap-and-Trade, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 48–53 (2012); Robert N. Stavins, Enviro 
Justice and Cap-and-Trade, THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM 20 (May/June 2008), available at 
http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedFiles/Publishing/Articles/eli_2008mj_stavins.pdf.  
In the United States, the environmental justice community has been largely focused on the 
environmental, rather than the economic, impacts of climate mitigation measures.  See 
Farber, supra, at 8 n.27. Climate adaptation also presents significant environmental justice 
issues, both domestically and internationally.  Poor and marginalized communities are the most 
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, and their particular vulnerabilities suggest the 
importance of developing tailored climate adaptation strategies. See, e.g., Alice Kaswan, 
Domestic Climate Change Adaptation and Equity, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. 11125 (2012) 
[hereinafter Kaswan, Domestic Adaptation]. 
 2.  See James K. Boyce & Manuel Pastor, COOLING THE PLANET, CLEARING THE AIR: 
CLIMATE POLICY, CARBON PRICING, AND CO-BENEFITS 1 (2012), available at http://dornsife. 
usc.edu/assets/sites/242/docs/Cooling_the_Planet_Sept2012.pdf. 
 3.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-99 (West 2007). 
 4.  See CAL. AIR RES. BD., CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN ES-1 (2008) 
[hereinafter PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN], available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scoping 
plan/document/scopingplandocument.htm. 
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The law was one of the first in the nation to establish a comprehensive, 
economy-wide approach rather than addressing a single sector.5 
Environmental justice considerations were influential in the negotiations 
over, and development of, the legislation.  As Professor Julie Sze and 
colleagues have described, traditional air pollutants, rather than greenhouse 
gases, had greater political salience with Latino legislators likely to be 
swing votes on climate legislation.6  Mainstream environmental groups 
that played a key role in developing and lobbying for the legislation, like 
the Environmental Defense Fund (now Environmental Defense) and the 
Natural Resources Defense Council, recognized the political importance 
of linking GHGs and co-pollutants and promoted the incorporation of 
environmental justice provisions into the legislation to attract broader 
legislative support.7 
As a consequence, the legislation contains numerous references to 
environmental justice. The statute explicitly encourages the California 
Air Resources Board (ARB) to maximize the co-benefits of greenhouse 
gas reductions, including environmental co-benefits, and to “complement[] 
the state’s efforts to improve air quality.”8  It states that ARB must “[e]nsure 
that the activities undertaken to comply with [its] regulations  do not 
disproportionately impact low-income communities.”9  On the economic 
front, AB 32 requires the state to “direct public and private investment 
toward the most disadvantaged communities in California,”10 suggesting 
that green jobs programs or other investments to reduce emissions should 
benefit poorer communities. 
The statute also reflects the environmental justice community’s long-
standing concerns about cap-and-trade programs.  Although then-Governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger had advocated for a cap-and-trade program, the 
environmental justice community’s resistance to that option resulted in 
 
 5.  See California Cap-and-Trade Program Summary 1, CENTER FOR CLIMATE 
AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS (Jan. 2013), available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/calif-
cap-trade-01-13.pdf.  In contrast, the multi-state Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative adopted 
by many Northeastern and mid-Atlantic states focuses solely on power plant emissions. 
See generally Program Design, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi. 
org/design (last visited Dec. 8, 2013). 
 6.  Julie Sze, et al., Best in Show? Climate and Environmental Justice Policy in 
California, 2 ENVTL. JUSTICE 179, 179–81 (2009). 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38501(h).  AB 32 also states that the climate change 
regulations should complement “efforts to achieve and maintain federal and state ambient air 
quality standards and to reduce toxic air contaminant emissions.”  Id. § 38562(b)(4). The 
legislature instructed ARB to consider the implementing regulations’ “overall societal 
benefits, including reductions in other air pollutants . . . and other benefits to the economy, 
environment, and public health.” Id. § 38562(b)(6). 
 9.  Id. § 38562(b)(2). 
 10.  Id. § 38565. 
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provisions that gave the ARB the option, but not the mandate, to adopt 
cap-and-trade.11  AB 32 provides ARB with general authority to “adopt 
rules and regulations . . . to achieve the maximum technologically feasible 
and cost-effective greenhouse gas emission reductions . . .[,]”12 and 
states that the ARB “may,” not must, develop “market-based compliance 
mechanisms.”13  The provisions on market-based compliance mechanisms 
explicitly require ARB to consider localized environmental justice impacts 
before adopting a market-based program.14  They also require the agency 
to “[d]esign market-based mechanisms to prevent any increase in the 
emissions of toxic air contaminants or criteria pollutants”15 and to 
‘[m]aximize additional environmental and economic benefits for California, 
as appropriate.”16 
AB 32 also contains provisions to enhance participation from 
disadvantaged communities.  The statute required ARB to create an 
Environmental Justice Advisory Committee (EJAC) composed of 
representatives from the state’s most polluted areas.17  The law explicitly 
requires ARB to consult with a wide variety of stakeholders, including not 
only the regulated community, but also the environmental justice 
community and environmental organizations.18 
Thus, AB 32 encourages the development of climate change policies 
that address not only GHG emissions, but co-pollutants and other indirect 
consequences.  The explicit attention to environmental justice considerations 
throughout the statute undoubtedly created expectations within the 
environmental justice community that their concerns would play a key 
role in the statute’s implementation. 
 
 11.  See Sze, et al., supra note 6, at 183. 
 12.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38560. 
 13.  Id. § 38570(a) (stating that the ARB “may,” not must, develop “market-based 
compliance mechanisms”). 
 14.  Id. § 38570(b)(1) (“[T]he state board shall do all of the following: (1) Consider the 
potential for direct, indirect, and cumulative emission impacts from these mechanisms, 
including localized impacts in communities that are already adversely impacted by air 
pollution”). 
 15.  Id. § 38570(b)(2). 
 16.  Id. § 38570(b)(3). 
 17.  Id. § 38591(a). 
 18.  Id. § 38501(f). The statute also specified that ARB must hold public workshops in 
areas with poor air quality, areas that must include (but are not limited to) minority and 
low-income communities.  Id. § 38561(g). 
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B. AB 32 Implementation and the Emergence of Cap-and-Trade 
Governor Schwarzenegger’s interest in cap-and-trade did not wane 
when the legislature refused to mandate the program.  Shortly after AB 32 
was passed, the Governor, by Executive Order, established a “Market 
Advisory Committee.”19 This committee brought together experts on 
market-based mechanisms and instructed state agencies to “develop a 
comprehensive market-based compliance program.”20 The Market 
Advisory Committee focused on a cap-and-trade program for California 
and identified guiding principles and specific program design 
recommendations.21  These initiatives did not dictate the adoption of cap-
and-trade; a decision relegated to ARB, but they revealed the 
administration’s active development of cap-and-trade as a policy option. 
The Environmental Justice Advisory Committee, created pursuant to 
the statute, advocated strongly against the adoption of cap-and-trade and 
encouraged ARB to adopt alternative measures, including greater reliance on 
direct regulation, government incentives, and a carbon fee.22  
Nonetheless, the initial scoping plan, approved in December 2008, included 
a cap-and-trade program among a broad suite of measures to reduce GHG 
emissions.23 
After completing the Scoping Plan, ARB began to implement the 
Scoping Plan’s many elements, including developing specific regulations 
for the cap-and-trade program.  The cap-and-trade regulations were 
approved by the Air Resources Board in October 2011.24 The agency set 
the initial cap for 2012 and established a path of declining annual caps to 
achieve the 2020 goal.25  Beginning in 2012, the cap-and-trade program 
 
 19.  See Exec. Order No. S-20-06 (Oct. 18, 2006), available at http://www.casfcc. 
org/2/StationaryFuelCells/PDF/Executive%20Order%20S-20-06.pdf. 
 20.  Id. at ¶ 5. 
 21.  Recommendations for Designing a Cap-and-Trade System for California, 
MKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES. BD., (2007), available at http://www.energy. 
ca.gov/2007publications/ARB-1000-2007-007/ARB-1000-2007-007.pdf. 
 22.  See, e.g., ENVTL. JUSTICE ADVISORY COMM., RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS 
OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
GLOBAL WARMING SOLUTIONS ACT OF 2006 (AB 32) ON THE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN at 
39-42 (Dec. 2008) [hereinafter EJAC 2008], available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ejac/ 
proposedplan-ejaccommentsfinaldec10.pdf. 
 23.  PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN, supra note 4, at 30. 
 24.  See CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 17, §§ 95800-96022 (2012). The process began 
with a Preliminary Draft Regulation for a California Cap-and Trade Program, released in 
November 2009.  Preliminary Draft Regulation for a California Trade Program, CAL. AIR 
RES. BD. (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/meetings/ 
121409/pdr.pdf. 
 25.  See CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, California Cap-and-Trade 
Program Summary 4, 6 (Figure 2) (2013), available at http://www.c2es.org/doc Uploads/calif- 
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addresses emissions from large stationary sources, including electricity 
generators and large industrial facilities emitting more than 25,000 metric 
tons of carbon-dioxide equivalent (CO2E) per year.26  Beginning in 2015, 
the cap-and-trade program is to expand to include fuel distributors 
(including distributors of transportation fuels and heating fuels, like natural 
gas). By 2015, the cap-and-trade program is expected to include “eighty-
five percent of the state’s greenhouse gas emissions . . . .”27 
After intensive debate about selling allowances (at a state-run auction) 
versus distributing them without cost, the Agency developed a complex 
mechanism for distributing almost all of the allowances for free at the 
outset of the program. However, utilities must use the revenue for ratepayer 
benefit28 and there will be an increasing proportion of auctioned allowances 
in future allowance distributions.29  The cap-and-trade program allows the 
use of offsets—reductions by unregulated entities that can be used to 
“offset” and replace the reductions required in the regulated sectors.30  As 
further discussed below, ARB developed specific offset limitations and 
allowable offset protocols.31 
Although the Scoping Plan contains many GHG reduction measures, 
cap-and-trade is the primary control mechanism for industrial sources.  
The Scoping Plan contemplates direct industry controls only for those 
industries with extensive fugitive emissions that cannot be adequately 
tracked or monitored under a cap-and-trade program, including oil and 
gas extraction, natural gas transmission, and refineries.32  The Scoping 
 
cap-trade-01-13.pdf. The cap increases, rather than decreases, in 2015 to accommodate the 
addition of fuels to the program.  Nonetheless, the overall trajectory for stationary sources 
and fuels distributors is one of decreasing emissions.  See id. 
 26.  Id. at 2. 
 27.  Id. at 1. 
 28.  See Philippe Brisson, et al., California’s Cap-and-Trade Regulations: Design 
Elements and Outstanding Issues, WORLD CLIMATE REPORT, (Dec. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.bna.com/uploadedFiles/Content/Press/California_Cap-and-Trade_Regulations 
_Design_Elements.pdf. See infra note 171 and accompanying text (describing use of 
allowance revenue). 
 29.  Brisson, et. al. at 2. 
 30.  See generally id. at 3. 
 31.  See infra notes 73 to 80 and accompanying text. 
 32.  See id. at 55.  ARB anticipates proposing measures to address emissions from 
oil and gas extraction in 2014.  As of late 2013, the agency is still collecting data to 
determine how to address natural gas pipeline distribution leaks.  In the refinery context, 
ARB is working with local air districts to address refinery methane emissions, and is no 
longer pursuing state-level controls for refinery flaring in light of existing controls by local 
air districts.  Climate Change Scoping Plan First Update: Discussion Draft for Public 
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Plan also includes a requirement for energy efficiency audits designed to 
generate additional information about industry emissions, information that 
could, potentially, lead to future direct industrial controls.  Large industries 
and power plants must conduct energy efficiency audits that assess GHG 
reduction potential as well as associated co-pollutant reductions.33  The 
audits do not, however, require reductions, and ARB has not yet determined 
whether the information obtained will be translated into direct regulatory 
requirements for increased energy efficiency.34  It remains unclear whether 
they will provide the basis for future revisions to permit conditions or 
future regulatory action to directly require industrial energy efficiency 
improvements. 
In contrast to the industrial sector, numerous complementary measures 
will have an impact on electricity sector emissions.  In addition to AB 32, 
California has adopted legislation limiting future reliance on high-emitting 
energy sources (that is, coal-fired power).35  The state has also adopted a 
renewable portfolio standard that requires the state to obtain thirty-three 
percent of its electricity from renewable sources by 2020;36 the greater the 
share of renewable energy, the smaller the share of GHG-emitting fossil-
fuel sources.  In addition, the Scoping Plan seeks to reduce electricity- related 
emissions by reducing energy demand through more stringent building 
and appliance standards, as well as other consumer energy efficiency 
incentives.37 
 
Review and Comment 36-37, CAL. AIR RES. BD. (Oct. 2013), available at http:// 
www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/2013_update/discussion_draft.pdf. 
 33.  See PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN, supra note 4, at 54. 
 34.  As of Fall 2013, ARB is mid-way through the process of obtaining the energy 
efficiency and co-pollutant reports.  See SCOPING PLAN FIRST UPDATE DISCUSSION DRAFT, 
supra note 32, at 36. ARB is summarizing the information into sector-specific summary 
reports, and “will use these findings to identify the best approaches to secure energy 
efficiency improvements and the associated emissions reductions at California’s largest 
facilities.” Id. 
 35.  SB 1368 “created greenhouse gas performance standards for new long-term 
financial investments in base-load electricity generation serving California customers.”  
PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN, supra note 4, at 5.  The law covers both in-state electricity generation 
and out-of-state electricity imported into California.  See Patricia Weisselberg, Comment, 
Shaping the Energy Future of the American West: Can California Curb Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Out-of-State, Coal-Fired Power Plants Without Violating the Dormant 
Commerce Clause?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 185 (2007). 
 36.  PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN, supra note 4, at 44.  The state adopted legislation 
mandating the 33 percent RPS in 2011.  See California Public Utilities Commission, RPS 
Program Overview, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/overview.htm (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2013).  The Scoping Plan also incentivizes solar power through 
implementation of Governor Schwarzenegger’s Million Solar Roofs Program.  PROPOSED 
SCOPING PLAN, supra note 4, at 53. 
 37.  See id. at 41–44. 
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Although transportation fuels will come under the cap-and-trade program 
in 2015, numerous complementary measures have and will continue to 
affect transportation-related emissions, which are a primary source of both 
GHG and traditional pollution in California.  Mechanisms to reduce vehicle 
emissions include California’s GHG standards for cars38 and a low-carbon 
fuel standard.39  Recognizing the connection between land use patterns, 
vehicle miles travelled, and transportation emissions, the Scoping Plan 
includes anticipated reductions from regional transportation and land use 
plans developed pursuant to SB 375, a land-use-oriented GHG reduction 
law adopted in 2008.40 
Thus, the Scoping Plan measures address a range of emissions sources 
in a wide variety of ways.  Nonetheless, cap-and-trade emerged as the 
primary restraint on individual stationary emissions sources, particularly 
for industrial sources.  Moreover, although measures like the Renewable 
Portfolio Standard and efforts to enhance consumer energy efficiency will 
have an indirect effect on power plant emissions, cap-and-trade provides the 
only direct constraint on existing power plant emissions.  Recent 
environmental justice lawsuits reflect the environmental justice 
community’s dissatisfaction with this state of affairs. 
III.  THE LAWSUITS 
Environmental advocates have brought three different legal actions 
against ARB.  The first, Association of Irritated Residents Association v. 
CARB, challenged various features of the scoping plan and the 
environmental review document accompanying it.  The second, Coalition 
for a Safe Environment, et al., v. CARB, consisted of a complaint filed 
with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency arguing that the cap-and-
 
 38.  See id. at 38-41.  Prominent among these strategies are the “Pavley greenhouse 
gas vehicle standards,” named after the legislator, Fran Pavley, who spearheaded 
California GHG vehicle emission standard legislation in 2002.  See id. at 39. Additional 
measures include promoting other vehicle efficiency improvements, like tire inflation, id. 
at 51, mechanisms, like port electrification or controls on truck emissions, to reduce 
emissions associated with goods movement, id. at 52–54, and promotion of high-speed 
rail.  Id. at 56. 
 39.  See id. at 46–47. 
 40.  SB 375 requires the state to develop regional passenger vehicle GHG emissions 
reduction targets and then requires regional Metropolitan Planning Organizations to 
develop sustainable communities strategies that demonstrate how future land use patterns 
would reduce transportation emissions. See id. at 47–48. 
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trade program violates federal civil rights regulations.  The third, Citizens 
Climate Lobby v. CARB, brought by two environmental groups, 
challenged ARB’s offset approval methodology.  The central claims and 
resolution of each case are discussed immediately below, while their larger 
lessons are discussed in Part IV. 
A.  Association of Irritated Residents: A Challenge to the Scoping        
Plan and the Functional Equivalent Document 
Six months after the Scoping Plan’s adoption, in June 2009, several 
environmental justice organizations and environmental justice activists 
brought suit in Association of Irritated Residents v. California Air 
Resources Board, arguing that the Scoping Plan did not comply with AB 
32 and that ARB’s “Functional Equivalent Document” (FED) did not 
adequately analyze the Plan’s environmental impacts.41  The FED is the 
environmental review mechanism for ARB actions, and is largely 
equivalent to an Environmental Impact Report under California’s  
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).42 
1.  The Scoping Plan Challenges 
Petitioners raised numerous objections to the Scoping Plan; this essay 
highlights the most significant claims that raise the most important policy 
issues.  Petitioners argued that the Scoping Plan did not go far enough.  They 
alleged that the Scoping Plan focused solely on meeting the specific 
emissions goal of reducing 2020 emissions to 1990 levels, and failed to 
comply with the law’s independent requirement to adopt the “maximum 
technologically feasible and cost-effective reductions.”43 In other words, 
Petitioners argued that the 2020 goal was a minimum and that ARB had an 
independent obligation to pursue the “maximum” feasible and cost-effective 
reductions. 
In a March 2011 order, the District Court rejected these allegations, a 
judgment that was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals.44  The 
 
 41.  Petitioners included the Association of Irritated Residents, California Communities 
Against Toxics, Coalition for a Safe Environment, Communities for a Better Environment, 
Society for Positive Action, West County Toxics Coalition, and several environmental 
justice activists as individuals.  See Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. 
09-509562, slip op. at 19–21  (Ca. Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 2011), http://cdn.law.ucla.edu/Site 
CollectionDocuments/Environmental%20Law/Court%27s%20Final%20Order%203%20
17%2011.pdf. 
 42.  See id. 
 43.  Id. at 7. 
 44.  See Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 206 Cal. App. 4th 1487 
(2012). 
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Appellate Court noted that the Scoping Plan’s focus on achieving 1990 
GHG levels by 2020 is a step in a longer process of developing emission 
reduction mechanisms, and does not constitute ARB’s final regulatory 
stance.45  Moreover, the Appellate Court observed that the Agency’s 
analysis of the technological and economic feasibility of a wide range of 
options suggested that ARB had attempted to identify the maximum 
available reductions. It further noted that ARB’s decision not to take 
particular measures appeared motivated by substantive concerns about the 
measures, not by an unwillingness to reduce emissions to the maximum 
extent possible.46 
Petitioners also alleged that ARB failed to go far enough because it did 
not adopt sufficient direct controls on agriculture and industry.47  The 
District Court noted that ARB had evaluated controls in the agricultural 
sector and that the agency’s decision not to pursue direct regulatory 
controls was not arbitrary and capricious in light of its determination that 
it lacked sufficient information about the complex biological systems at 
issue.48  In addition, the District Court concluded that, contrary to 
Petitioners’ claim, ARB had not excluded industry because large industries 
are incorporated in the state’s cap-and-trade program.49 
Many of Petitioners’ remaining arguments were directed to ARB’s 
emphasis on a cap-and-trade program.  The District Court observed that 
the agency had included cap-and-trade as one mechanism among many 
complementary measures, and that “[a]s the agency with technical expertise 
and the responsibility for the protection of California’s air resources, ARB 
has substantial discretion to determine the mix of measures needed to 
‘facilitate’ the achievement of greenhouse gas reductions.”50 
 
 45.  Id. at 1496–97. 
 46.  The appellate court also stated that the statute, in at least one place, explicitly 
connected the “maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective reductions” requirement 
to the goal of “achieving the statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit.” Id. at 1497. 
However, the “maximum achievable” language is linked specifically to the emissions goal 
in only one section, § 38560.5(c).  Id. In numerous other sections, the “maximum 
achievable” language appears to be independent of the achievement of the specific 2020 
emissions reduction goal. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38560, 38561(a), 38561(b). 
 47.  See Association of Irritated Residents, slip op. at 8. 
 48.  Id. at 8–9.  The appellate court likewise concluded that ARB’s approach to the 
agricultural sector was “neither arbitrary nor irrational.”  See Ass’n of Irritated Residents, 206 
Cal. App. 4th at 1502–03. 
 49.  Ass’n of Irritated Residents, No. 09-509562, slip op. at 9. 
 50.  Id. at 11.  The appellate court observed that ARB had properly assessed and 
rejected alternative approaches. Ass’n of Irritated Residents, 206 Cal. App. 4th at 1498–
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Petitioners also asserted that ARB’s analysis of the trading program’s 
co-pollutant impacts was insufficient51 because it failed to consider the 
risks and costs of potential pollution increases if facilities purchased 
allowances rather than reducing emissions.52  The District Court rejected 
some of the Petitioners’ criticisms,53 validated others,54 and left some 
unanswered.55  Ultimately, the District Court concluded that, “[w]hile there 
may be flaws in the analyses, Petitioners fall short of demonstrating that 
ARB was arbitrary and capricious . . .,”56 a conclusion upheld by the 
Appellate Court.57 
2.  The FED Challenges 
The Petitioners alleged that ARB’s FED on the Scoping Plan failed to 
adequately analyze alternatives to the cap-and-trade program.58  They 
 
1500. The court concluded “[i]t is not for the court to re-evaluate ARB’s judgment call, 
which is neither arbitrary nor unsupported in the record.” Id. at 1499–1500. It should be 
noted that the appellate court’s evaluation of the adequacy of the ARB’s analysis of 
alternatives related to whether the choice of cap-and-trade was arbitrary and capricious; 
the appellate court did not analyze the separate issue of whether the alternatives analysis 
in the Functional Equivalent Document was adequate. See id. at 1495. 
 51.  Ass’n of Irritated Residents, No. 09-509562, slip op. at 12. More specifically, 
Petitioners asserted that ARB did not analyze the potential disproportionate impacts of 
controlling agricultural emissions through voluntary measures (incentivized as offset 
projects) rather than directly regulating agricultural emissions. Id. at 12–13. Petitioners 
also argued that ARB’s assessment of cap-and-trade impacts was too limited because it 
focused only on certain sectors, certain pollutants, and certain geographic regions, rather 
than providing a more comprehensive analysis. Id. at 14–15. 
 52.  Id. at 16. 
 53.  For example, the court concluded that ARB had analyzed the impacts in the 
largest-emitting sectors, and had adequately explained why it could not provide a quantitative 
analysis in the remaining sectors.  Id. at 15.  The court also concluded that the agency’s 
choice of Wilmington, California as an example for evaluating local impacts was appropriate 
because it contains a concentrated number of industrial facilities, and that the analysis 
scrupulously acknowledged the possibility that most benefits would not accrue locally. Id. 
at 16. The court did not, however, address Petitioners’ concern that ARB had not evaluated 
the potential for emissions increases. 
 54.  The district court acknowledged that ARB’s analysis of the environmental 
impacts of voluntary compared to direct regulation of agricultural emissions was weak. Id. 
at 14. 
 55.  Except to address ARB’s analysis of Wilmington, CA as a sample area, the 
district court did not analyze the Petitioners’ concerns about the limited number of pollutants 
analyzed, nor did it address whether the agency should have more comprehensively 
analyzed potential local impacts in more geographic areas. See generally id. at 14–16. 
 56.  Id. at 16. 
 57.  See 206 Cal. App. 4th at 1503–1505. 
 58.  Ass’n of Irritated Residents, No. 09-509562, slip op. at 29. Petitioners argued 
the FED did not adequately identify potential adverse environmental impacts or develop 
mitigation measures for the impacts, instead improperly deferring that analysis to 
individual rulemaking proceedings. Id. at 24. The District Court concluded that the FED 
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noted that the FED contained only three pages of discussion on alternatives 
to cap-and-trade, and that those three pages primarily justified cap-and-
trade rather than exploring viable alternatives and comparing them with 
cap-and-trade.  Procedurally, the Petitioners also argued that the Agency 
improperly approved and began implementing the Scoping Plan before it 
had certified the FED.59 
The District Court agreed with the Petitioners and found the alternatives 
analysis, and hence the FED, inadequate.  It stated that, “ARB seeks to 
create a fait accompli by premature establishment of a cap-and-trade 
program before alternatives can be exposed to public comment and properly 
evaluated by ARB itself.”60  Moreover, the Court agreed with the Petitioners 
that ARB had improperly approved the Scoping Plan before responding 
to comments on its FED, undermining its capacity to make an informed 
decision.61 
At the time, the environmental justice groups who had brought suit 
hoped that the Court’s ruling would create a window of opportunity for 
the newly-elected Governor, Jerry Brown, to re-think ARB’s commitment to 
cap-and-trade and change course toward more direct regulation or a 
carbon tax.  In July 2011, forty-one organizations from California, the U.S., 
and other countries signed a letter to Governor Brown requesting that he 
“rescue the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32) 
from the uncritical trust in markets that characterized [former Governor] 
Arnold Schwarzenegger’s approach to addressing climate change.”62 
However, the administration did not change course.  ARB instead 
developed a Supplemental FED to provide more detail on the strengths 
 
included sufficient detail for a programmatic analysis, and that ARB properly deferred 
more detailed analyses to individual rulemakings. Id. at 25–27. 
 59.  Id. at 32. 
 60.  Id. at 31–32.  The District Court also stated that CEQA requires a more 
detailed analysis of alternatives “so that the public may know not only why cap-and-trade 
was chosen, but also why the alternatives were not.” Id. 
 61.  Id. at 32–34.  The district court enjoined ARB from further implementing the 
cap-and-trade features of the Scoping Plan until it completed a legally sufficient FED. See 
Ass’n of Irritated Residents, No. 09-509562, slip op. at 3–4. That injunction was ultimately 
stayed by an appellate court while ARB completed its Supplemental FED. See Bob Egelko, 
Calif. Cap and Trade Plan Cleared by Court, S.F. CHRON., June 29, 2011, at 1. 
 62.  See Letter from Bay Localize, et al., to The Honorable Edmund G Brown, Jr. 
(July 28, 2011), available at http://ggucuel.org/wp-content/uploads/EJ-letter-re-cap-and-
trade.pdf. Environmental justice advocates reportedly submitted almost 1000 petitions 
asking the Governor to reconsider the cap-and-trade program.  See Wyatt Buchanan, State Air 
Board Backs Cap and Trade on Emissions, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 25, 2011, at 2. 
KASWAN(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE) 10/6/2016  8:29 AM 
 
14 
and weaknesses of cap-and-trade alternatives, including direct regulation 
and a carbon tax.63  With the Supplemental FED complete, the Board voted 
again to adopt the Scoping Plan and found that the Scoping Plan, including a 
cap-and-trade program, would better meet the state’s objective than any 
of the possible alternatives.64  In December 2011, the District Court ruled 
that the Supplemental FED was adequate and that ARB had justified its 
regulatory choices.65 
B.  Title VI Complaint Against the Cap-and-Trade                                
Program: Disparate Impact 
In 2012, the Center for Race, Poverty, and the Environment (CRPE), on 
behalf of several environmental justice groups, initiated a second strategy for 
blocking the cap-and-trade program.  In a complaint filed with the EPA’s 
Office of Civil Rights, CRPE argued that a cap-and-trade program’s 
potential adverse co-pollutant impacts on communities constitute 
discrimination in violation of Title VI of the federal Civil Rights Act.66  
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination by state agencies, 
like ARB, that receive federal funds.67 The EPA, like many federal 
agencies, adopted implementing regulations that prohibit its funding 
recipients from engaging in both intentional discrimination and actions 
that cause a discriminatory impact.68  Accordingly, environmental justice 
advocates alleged that a cap-and-trade program would be unlawfully 
discriminatory because, by allowing covered entities to purchase 
 
 63.  Final Supplement to the AB 32 Scoping Plan Functional Equivalent Document, 
CAL. AIR RES. BD., (Aug. 19, 2011), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/ 
document/final_supplement_to_sp_fed.pdf. 
 64.  CAL. AIR RES. BD., RESOLUTION 11-27 (Aug. 24, 2011), available at http://www. 
arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/final_res_scoping_plan_08242011.pdf. 
 65.  See Bob Egelko, S.F. Judge OKs Cap and Trade for Emissions Law, S.F. CHRON., 
Dec. 8, 2011, at 1. 
 66.  COALITION FOR A SAFE ENVIRONMENT, V. CAL. AIR RES. BD., Complaint under 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [hereinafter Title VI Complaint], available at 
http://ggucuel.org/wp-content/uploads/6.8.12-CSE-v.-CARB-TItle-VI-complaint2.pdf. 
 67.  42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2014). 
 68.  Although the statute prohibits only intentional discrimination, implementing 
agencies have adopted regulations prohibiting disparate impacts as well. EPA regulations 
prohibit a state or local recipient of federal funds from “administering its program [so as 
to] have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination . . . or have the effect of 
defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program or 
activity with respect to individuals of a particular race, color, national origin, or sex.”  40 
C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (2014). 
KASWAN(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE) 10/6/2016  8:29 AM 
[VOL. 5:  1, 2013–14]  Climate Change and Environmental Justice 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
 15 
allowances, the program could fail to decrease pollution—and might lead to 
increases in air pollution—in communities of color.69 
The EPA dismissed the complaint as unripe because the program’s 
official compliance obligations would not begin until January 2013 and, 
therefore, no harm had yet occurred.70  The CPRE has indicated that it will 
consider re-filing its complaint as California’s cap-and-trade program 
proceeds.71  It remains unclear how the EPA would rule on the merits. 
C.  Citizens Climate Lobby v. CARB: The Offsets Litigation 
In March 2012, environmental organizations challenged ARB’s approach 
to offset use in the planned cap-and-trade program in Citizens Climate 
Lobby v. CARB.  Although not technically an “environmental justice” 
lawsuit, I discuss the case because offsets have been a lightning rod for 
environmental justice concerns. 
1. Background on AB 32 and Offsets 
Under ARB’s cap-and-trade program, covered entities can use two types 
of “compliance instruments” to cover their emissions.  They can use the 
emissions allowances allocated to all of the entities that are included in 
the cap-and-trade program (the “covered sectors”).  In addition, they can 
purchase offsets that represent GHG reductions made outside the covered 
sectors, reductions that will offset the purchasing facilities’ emissions.  
For example, if a timber company conserves trees that would otherwise 
be harvested, it could sell offsets representing the sequestered carbon to a 
refinery.  The refinery, which must account for all emissions, would then use 
the offsets to cover some of its GHG emissions.  Under the cap-and-trade 
program, facilities can use offsets to cover a maximum of eight percent 
 
 69.  See Title VI Complaint, supra note 66, at 17–28; Peter Fimrite, EPA Complaint Says 
Cap-and-Trade Racially Biased, S.F. CHRON., June 12, 2012, at 1. 
 70.  See EPA, Groups Debate ‘Ripeness’ in Title VI Protest to California’s Cap-
and-Trade, INSIDEDEFENSE.COM, http://insidedefense.com/Inside-Cal/EPA/Inside-Cal/EPA-  
10/12/2012/epa-groups-debate-ripeness-in-title-vi-protest-to-california-cap-aamp-trade/menu- 
id-1097.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
 71.  See Climate Justice in California, CENTER ON RACE, POVERTY AND THE ENV’T, 
http://www.crpe-ej.org/crpe/index.php/campaigns/climate-justice/california (last visited Nov. 
20, 2013). 
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of their total emissions.72  As discussed in more detail below, offsets could 
therefore cover a significant percentage of the needed reductions. 
To maintain the integrity of the cap-and-trade program, ARB must 
determine whether offsets are legitimate and meet numerous statutory 
criteria.  ARB has developed four offset protocols that define allowable 
offsets and the rules for approving them.73  The first is a Livestock Protocol, 
which permits offsets for anaerobic manure digesters that convert manure 
into methane that could be used for energy or flared.74  The second is the 
Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS) Protocol, which allows offsets for 
destruction of ODSs.75  The third is the Urban Forest Protocol, which allows 
offsets for planting trees in urban settings.76  The fourth is the U.S. 
Forest Protocol, which allows offsets for reforestation, improved forest 
management, and forest conservation.  The protocol permits forestry offsets 
only for measures taken in the United States, not, at present, for 
international forestry measures.77 
ARB designed the offset protocols to meet AB 32’s offset integrity 
requirements.  AB 32 requires that all emissions reductions be “real, 
permanent, quantifiable, verifiable, and enforceable,”78 and further states 
that the reductions must be “in addition to any greenhouse gas emission 
reduction otherwise required by law . . . [or] that otherwise would occur.”79 
2.  The Offsets Lawsuit 
The lawsuit challenged ARB’s methodology for evaluating whether 
proposed offsets are “additional.”  As the District  Court observed, 
 
 72.  Chapter 6: What are the Requirements for Offset Credits and How Are They 
Issued?, CAL. AIR RES. BD., (Dec. 19, 2012), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/cap 
andtrade/offsets/chapter6.pdf. 
 73.  See Compliance Offset Program, CAL. AIR RES. BD., http://www.arb.ca.gov/ 
cc/capandtrade/offsets/offsets.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).  The offset protocols were 
approved along with the cap-and-trade program.  Id. 
 74.  See Compliance Offset Protocol, Livestock Projects: Capturing and Destroying 
Methane from Manure Management Systems, CAL. AIR RES. BD., (Oct. 2011), available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/coplivestockfin.pdf. 
 75.  See Compliance Offset Protocol, Destruction of U.S. Ozone Depleting Substances 
Banks, CAL. AIR. RES. BD., (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/ 
capandtrade10/copodsfin.pdf. 
 76.  See generally Compliance Offset Protocol, Urban Forest Projects, CAL. AIR. 
RES. BD., (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/ 
copurbanforestfin.pdf. 
 77.  See generally Compliance Offset Protocol, U.S. Forest Projects,  CAL. AIR. RES. 
BD., (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/copus 
forest.pdf. 
 78.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(d)(1) (West 2007). 
 79.  Id. § 38562(d)(2). 
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“[a]dditionality is essential to the environmental integrity of an offset 
program because if reductions are not additional, then the cap-and-trade 
program will not reduce GHG emissions beyond what would have occurred 
anyway.”80  The court observed further that non-additional offsets would 
“undercut[] the cap-and-trade program because [they] substitute[] illusory 
reductions, those that would have occurred anyway, for real reductions 
that the capped sources should have undertaken.”81  Determining whether 
reductions are “additional” is an inherently challenging enterprise because it 
requires assessing what would have happened in the absence of the offset 
program, always a matter of debate. 
Rather than evaluating the “additionality” of each individual offset credit 
application—for example, by evaluating whether a specific dairy would 
have installed a manure digester or whether a specific company would have 
destroyed ozone-depleting substances in the absence of the offset program— 
the Offset Protocols establish a “standard additionality mechanism” that 
assumes certain behavior in each context.  The protocols indicate that ARB 
will accept offsets whenever the proposed offset activity exceeds the 
standard performance in that context.  So, for example, since neither manure 
digesters nor destruction of ozone depleting substances are “common 
practice,” ARB determined that emissions reductions from any such 
proposed projects would qualify as offsets.  As a consequence, a dairy or 
ODS-destroying company seeking to sell offsets would not have to prove to 
ARB that it would not have installed the digester or destroyed the ODSs 
without the offset program.82  In the urban forest context, the Agency 
determined that the net gain in trees from municipal or educational entities’ 
tree-planting programs would qualify because increases in tree planting 
were not the norm in most cities.83  The forestry protocol is more complex, 
but, by way of example, it includes a performance standard for reforestation- 
based credits that provides offset credits only if the land to be reforested 
 
 80.  Citizen’s Climate Lobby v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. 12-519554, slip op. at 11 (Cal. 
Jan. 25, 2013). 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 13–14 (describing how neither manure digesters nor ODS destruction are 
common practice and indicating that all such projects would therefore be eligible offset 
projects). 
 83.  Id. at 15 (reasoning that because utilities rarely plant trees, all trees planted by 
utilities are eligible for offset credits). 
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had been largely bare of trees for more than ten years, and there is little 
indication that reforestation would otherwise occur.84 
The Petitioners argued that ARB’s approach violated AB 32 because it 
did not adequately ensure additionality.  They argued that AB 32 requires 
ARB to ensure that all offsets are additional, and that a performance-
standard approach that looks at general norms rather than a particular 
operator would fail to ensure that that particular project would not have 
occurred but for the offset program.  The Petitioners identified numerous 
ways in which many of uncommon offset activities could, in individual 
cases, be motivated by factors other than the offset program and, hence, 
fail to be additional.85 
The District Court rejected Petitioners’ arguments.  The Court held that 
individual project assessments are equally problematic given the difficulty of 
assessing future emissions and future behavior on a project-by-project 
basis.  It observed that offset programs engaged in project-based 
assessments, like the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, 
had encountered numerous inaccuracies, difficulties, and costs that rendered 
them as or more uncertain than ARB’s chosen standards-based approach.86  
The Court stated that its role was not “to decide that one methodology 
trumps another when decisions are made based on extensive research, 
stakeholder input, public input, and fact-based analysis.”87 
As of this writing, Petitioners have appealed the offsets ruling.  Given 
the difficulty of finding any objective and fully accurate metric for  
 
 84.  Id. at 16.  The U.S. Forest Offset Protocol is complex and contains many more 
provisions to address additionality and compensate for potential leakage.  See id. at 16–
17. 
 85.  For example, Petitioners noted that a given project operator might have 
“compelling financial reasons to install the biogas control system in the absence of the 
offset payment,” including potential profits from biogas sales or reduced liability for the 
environmental harms caused by open manure lagoons.  Brief for Petitioner at 8, Citizen’s 
Climate Lobby v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. 12-519554 (Cal. Jan. 25, 2013). In the ODS 
context, Petitioners questioned ARB data suggesting that ODS destruction is currently 
very rare, and argued that it could be a sustainable business practice even without offsets.  
Id. at 30. In the Urban Forest context, Petitioners suggested that the assumption that cities 
do not add trees is misguided because the many benefits of tree planting could well lead 
cities to increase planting. Id. at 32–33. Petitioners voiced additional critiques of the 
forest protocols, most of which questioned the assumption that any given project could 
be considered “additional.”  See id. at 34–40. 
 86.  Citizen’s Climate Lobby, No. 12-519554, slip op. at 11 (Cal. Jan. 25, 2013). 
 87.  Id. The court reasoned that determining additionality is inherently uncertain, 
regardless of the chosen methodology, and that requiring ARB to achieve certainty would 
require the abandonment of the offset program.  Since all parties agreed that ARB did have 
the legislative authority to implement an offset program, the court declined to set a 
standard for certainty that would be impossible to achieve.  Id. at 24–25. 
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determining additionality and judicial deference to agency expertise, the 
trial court’s decision is likely to be upheld. 
IV.  LESSONS FROM THE LITIGATION 
The lawsuits against California’s climate program in general, and its 
cap-and-trade program in particular, likely reflect environmental justice 
groups’ frustration that AB 32’s environmental justice provisions have 
failed to play a significant role in the law’s implementation.  Of course, 
many AB 32 programs will have important co-pollutant benefits, 
particularly in the transportation and power sectors.  At the same time, 
however, except for the non-regulatory energy efficiency and co-pollutant 
benefits audits, the Agency’s industry provisions did not integrate co-
pollutant considerations, a significant concern to groups facing concentrated 
and intractable pollution in their communities.88 
Reactions to the environmental justice litigation were strong.  
Environmentalists questioned whether the environmental justice community 
was fundamentally undermining climate change progress, and playing 
into the hands of those opposed to climate action.89  Environmental justice 
groups, for their part, did not perceive themselves as undermining AB 32 
because, from their perspective, greenhouse gas trading programs have 
proven not only unjust, but also ineffective.  Thus, from their view, the 
lawsuits were not only about their particular environmental justice  
 
 88.  Tellingly, in the Fall 2013 discussion draft of the first update to the Scoping Plan, 
all the public health benefits from mitigation measures were attributed to reductions in 
non-industrial sectors. See Scoping Plan First Update Discussion Draft, supra note 32, 
at 56. 
 89.  See Farber, supra note 1 at 3 (observing tension between environmental and 
environmental justice organizations over the role of environmental justice in climate 
policy, especially in relation to the litigation to block California’s cap-and-trade program); 
Alan Ramo, Update: Order Temporarily Stayed Pending Further Briefing on Stay, 
GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY CENTER ON URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW BLOG (May 23, 
2011), http://ggucuel.org/update-on-ab-32-case-judge-issues-narrow-writ (observing that 
the Petitioners had “taken a bit of heat from mainstream environmental organizations”). 
Alan Ramo, Failure to Launch, THE RECORDER (Apr. 22, 2011, 1:46 PM), http://digital 
commons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1231&context=pubs (alluding to the 
argument that CEQA should not be used to delay environmentally beneficial projects). 
Cf. Wyatt Buchanan, Cap and Trade Sparks Renewed Political Debate, S.F. CHRON. 
(June 12, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/green/article/Cap-and-trade-sparks-
renewed-political-debate-2368496.php (quoting Environmental Defense climate director 
statement that ARB backing away from cap-and-trade could galvanize the fossil fuel 
industry to oppose climate change measures and would be politically “crippling”). 
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concerns; the lawsuits were designed to steer California away from a 
fundamentally flawed policy approach. Moreover, to the extent the agency’s 
analysis did not comply with the state’s environmental review statutes, 
environmental justice groups saw their role as holding the agency 
accountable. 
As the cases recede, the question becomes not whether the environmental 
groups should have brought suit, but rather what can be learned from their 
lawsuits.  Although many claims were raised, the cap-and-trade program 
is the flashpoint for the environmental justice community’s reaction to 
AB 32 implementation. Therefore, the discussion below focuses on the 
environmental justice critiques of cap-and-trade.  These critiques can be 
divided into two categories: claims rooted in traditional environmental justice 
themes like distributional and participatory justice, and claims rooted in the 
environmental justice community’s deep suspicion about the efficacy of 
cap-and-trade as a climate policy mechanism. 
A couple of caveats are in order.  First, my intention is to deepen 
awareness of the environmental justice critiques and help secure their 
place on the climate policy table.  Full resolution of the complex issues 
they raise is beyond the scope of this essay. Second, my goal in this 
Essay is to illuminate the views of environmental justice advocates; not 
expound my own views. As I have discussed elsewhere, my own view on 
cap-and-trade is highly context-specific, and I do not attempt to articulate 
the nuances of that position here.90 
A.  Core Environmental Justice Considerations 
1.  The Role of Co-pollutant Considerations in Climate Policy 
As noted implicitly throughout the foregoing, the environmental justice 
community believes that co-pollutant considerations are relevant to climate 
policy.  That raises the threshold inquiry: should they be?91 As the potential 
impacts of climate change become increasingly certain and increasingly 
 
 90.  See Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, the Clean Air Act, and Industrial Pollution, 
30 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 51 (2012) [hereinafter Kaswan, Climate Change]; Alice 
Kaswan, Controlling Power Plants: The Co-Pollutant Implications of EPA’s Clean Air Act 
§ 111(d) Options, 32 VA. J. ENVTL. L. __ (forthcoming 2014) (article on file with author). 
 91.  Some commentators argue that California’s climate policy should focus solely on 
GHG reductions, and that indirect co-pollutant benefits should not be taken into 
consideration in policy design.  See Todd Schatzki et al., Addressing Environmental Justice 
Concerns in the Design of California’s Climate Policy (2009), available at http://www. 
analysisgroup.com/uploadedFiles/Publishing/Articles/Environmental_Justice.pdf. I provide 
a more in-depth exploration of the role of co-pollutants in climate policy in Kaswan, 
Climate Change, supra note 90, at 55–74 and in Alice Kaswan, Greening the Grid and 
Climate Justice, 39 ENVTL. L. 1143 (2009) [hereinafter Kaswan, Greening the Grid]. 
KASWAN(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE) 10/6/2016  8:29 AM 
[VOL. 5:  1, 2013–14]  Climate Change and Environmental Justice 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
 21 
dire, the importance of reducing GHGs as a central objective is 
unquestionable.  The issue of what else should be taken into account is 
controversial.  Some suggest that the most important parameter is cost-
effectiveness.92  Cost-effectiveness is critically important.  Cost effective 
strategies could reduce overall economic impact and promote economic 
justice, since high energy and product prices disproportionately impact 
the poor.  Cost-effectiveness could also reduce carbon leakage risks 
by reducing incentives for production to leave California.  Finally, cost-
effective strategies could increase policymakers’ willingness to adopt more 
stringent GHG reduction targets, of benefit to all and, more particularly, 
to the poor and marginalized who will be most severely impacted by 
climate change.  Without minimizing the importance of cost-effectiveness, 
however, other policy parameters are also relevant, including co-pollutant 
implications, technology-forcing incentives, potential job growth, and 
energy independence.93 
In the AB 32 context, the short answer to the role of co-pollutants and 
other considerations in program implementation is that the California 
Legislature resolved this question: it required ARB to seek to achieve 
multiple benefits, including co-pollutant benefits.94  But that leaves larger 
questions unanswered: why, and how important a role should the pursuit 
of such co-benefits play?95 
Environmental justice advocates believe that co-pollutant impacts should 
play a significant role in climate policy because, from a long-term 
 
 92.  See Ann Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade and 
Complementary Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 216 (2012). 
 93.  Some of these goals are mutually reinforcing, while others present difficult 
tradeoffs.  Of relevance to this essay, policies to maximize co-pollutant benefits could, in 
some instances, decrease cost-effectiveness if they increased the cost of GHG reduction.  
See id. at 210–11. At the same time, the benefits of reducing co-pollutants, measured in 
increased productivity and protected lives, could outweigh the additional costs of GHG 
reductions.  See Boyce & Pastor, supra note 2, at 6; see also Kaswan, Climate Change, 
supra note 90, at 72–73.  This essay does not attempt to resolve the debate; it merely argues 
that co-pollutant implications, and their relative costs and benefits, are a legitimate 
consideration. 
 94.  See Boyce & Pastor, supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 95.  See Farber, supra note 1, at 4 (discussing disputes about the role of environmental 
justice in GHG policy design). Professor Ann Carlson suggests that AB 32 should focus 
primarily on GHG emissions reduction and that co-pollutant considerations should be 
addressed solely by federal and state air pollution control laws. See Ann Carlson, AB 32 
Lawsuit: Assessing the Environmental Justice Arguments against Cap and Trade, LEGAL 
PLANET (Mar. 22, 2011), available at http://legal-planet.org/2011/03/22/ab-32-lawsuit-
assessing-the-environmental-justice-arguments-against-cap-and-trade/. 
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perspective, climate policies are likely to have a pervasive impact on many 
features of modern society, including energy systems, infrastructure, 
industry, and community design.  The EJAC has emphasized “the very 
significant stake that communities of color and low-income communities 
have in the policy choices and implementation of California’s greenhouse 
gas efforts[,]”96 a stake that derives from the relationship between 
greenhouse gas emissions and fossil fuel use, and the recognition that 
“addressing greenhouse gas emissions is about fundamentally changing 
the way we make and use energy.”97  As the EJAC states, “[p]eople of color 
and low-income communities are being crushed under an impossible load of 
emissions from fossil fuel usage,”98 and so greenhouse gas regulations that 
affect fossil fuel use will have a major impact on these communities. 
Moreover, when “efficiency” is considered in light of a policy’s total 
costs and benefits, rather than narrowly in terms of industrial cost-
effectiveness, integrating co-pollutant implications into climate policy 
design could have efficiency as well as equity benefits.99 Developing 
climate policies that indirectly influence such core features without 
attending to their ancillary impacts could lead to significant unintended 
negative consequences and fail to realize potentially substantial co-
benefits.100  The environmental justice community’s emphasis on co-
pollutant implications reflects the view that climate policies will lead to 
greater social welfare gains if such considerations are included, rather 
than excluded from the climate policy debate. 
The environmental justice community’s opposition to cap-and-trade, 
and the importance of co-pollutant provisions to the passage of AB 32, 
also send a signal about the complex politics of passing climate change 
legislation.  The common wisdom is that, to the extent that integrating co-
pollutant considerations into climate policies is resisted by industry or 
increases costs, it could impair the political feasibility of climate policies.101  
 
 96.  EJAC 2008, supra note 22, at 8. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  See Boyce & Pastor, supra note 2, at vi, 2–4.  Boyce and Pastor emphasize that 
failing to address co-pollutant benefits would leave “potential health-care savings . . . 
lying on the ground (or drifting in the air).”  Id. at vi. 
 100.  See Boyce & Pastor, supra note 2, at 4–6 (summarizing numerous studies 
identifying the large co-pollutant benefits that could result from climate policies); Kaswan, 
Climate Change, supra note 90, at 62–69 (describing the benefits of including co-pollutant 
considerations in climate policy notwithstanding the existence of separate authorities for 
their control); Kaswan, Greening the Grid, supra note 91, at 1153–54. 
 101.  Cf. Farber, supra note 1, at 30–31 (suggesting that cap-and-trade may be the 
only politically viable road forward and that efforts to achieve a “perfect” solution could 
impede progress on a politically acceptable approach), 41 (suggesting that the way forward may 
be cap-and-trade or nothing). 
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But it is also possible that integrating co-pollutant benefits—and other 
co-benefits—into climate policy debates could improve the political 
prospects for beleaguered climate policies. Political analysts suggest that 
climate policies’ co-pollutant and economic benefits have greater political 
salience than GHG reductions because they are more tangible and 
immediate. The projected economic benefits of AB 32, and its role in 
furthering California’s green technology industry, were frequently touted 
to promote the law’s passage.102  When a California ballot measure, Prop. 23, 
threatened to paralyze implementation, activists seeking to preserve the 
law repeatedly emphasized the law’s pollution reduction co-benefits as a 
reason to reject Prop 23,103 and the law’s air pollution benefits, not its 
global warming benefits, were more influential to voters who preserved the 
law.104 
At the national level and in many states, comprehensive climate change 
legislation continues to falter.  The reasons are complex and beyond the 
scope of this essay.  Nonetheless, a holistic and populist strategy that 
integrates co-pollutant considerations in a meaningful way might enhance the 
political momentum for national climate legislation.105  While industry may 
balk at the effort to tie together GHG and co-pollutant reduction goals, that 
linkage could help build a broader political coalition in support of much-
needed comprehensive climate legislation.106 
 
 102.  See Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change: What 
Role for Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 66 (2007) 
(describing Governor’s promotion of the economic benefits to be reaped from climate 
controls). 
 103.  See Boyce & Pastor, supra note 2, at vii (observing that advocates battling Prop. 
23 “found that stressing the policy’s immediate health benefits was highly persuasive, 
particularly among communities of color, who often feel the brunt of dirty air”). 
 104.  Bob Epstein, Lessons from Prop 23 – Winning Environmental Campaigns in 
the “Tea Party” Era 30, E2 ENVIRONMENTAL ENTREPRENEURS (last visited Dec. 12, 2013) 
http://www.e2.org/ext/doc/Epstein-ERG-April2011.pdf;jsessionid=E9B951F26C26D6F4 
C21174D7EEBDA774 (describing poll showing that people who voted against Prop. 23 
were more strongly motivated by concerns about air pollution and public health (18%) than 
by the need to address global warming (7%)). 
 105.  See Boyce & Pastor, supra note 2, at 1. As Boyce and Pastor state: “Because 
co-pollutants have clear and immediate health impacts, recognition of the magnitude and 
distribution of co-benefits can broaden and deepen support for climate policy among 
diverse sectors of the pubic and legislators.”  Id. at 1; see also Kaswan, Climate Change, 
supra note 90, at 74. 
 106.  See Boyce & Pastor, supra note 2, at vii. 
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2.  Distributional Consequences 
a.  What are the Distributional Effects? 
The environmental justice challenges have highlighted the potential 
distributional effects of cap-and-trade.  The distributional consequences 
of cap-and-trade programs are inherently uncertain; a trading program 
does not dictate reductions at all facilities.  Instead, facilities can choose 
how much to emit so long as they buy enough compliance instruments 
(including both allowances and offsets).  Therefore, even though emissions 
will go down in the aggregate, they could stay the same or even increase 
at facilities that choose to buy more compliance instruments.107 
While the distribution of GHG emissions is not significant, the 
distribution of associated co-pollutant emissions does matter.  The degree 
of harm associated with co-pollutant emissions varies depending upon 
population densities and exposure to cumulative pollution burdens.108  
Also relevant is an industry’s co-pollutant intensity: the ratio between co-
pollutants and GHG emissions.109  Moreover, environmental justice 
advocates emphasize the racial justice implications of trading.  Communities 
of color and poor communities experience disproportionate exposure to 
co-pollutants,110 so trading creates a potential risk of maintaining or 
exacerbating existing disparities. 
Professors Boyce and Pastor provide a useful illustration that helps 
illuminate the distributional issues.111  They have identified two facilities 
that emit roughly the same carbon emissions: the La Paloma natural gas 
 
 107.  Environmental justice advocates have long articulated their concerns about the 
distributional impacts of cap-and-trade in the context of traditional air pollutants.  See 
e.g., Lily N. Chinn, Can the Market Be Fair and Efficient? An Environmental Justice 
Critique of Emissions Trading, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 80 (1999); Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., 
Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air 
Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 231 (1999); Stephen M. Johnson, Economics 
v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111 (1999). 
 108.  See Boyce & Pastor, supra note 2, at 42–45 (discussing differences in cumulative 
impacts from multiple point sources). The authors focus on cumulative impacts from 
stationary sources.  See id. Also relevant are cumulative impacts from mobile and area 
sources.  See id. 
 109.  See Boyce & Pastor, supra note 2, at 21–36 (discussing differences in co-
pollutant intensity among and within industrial sectors). 
 110.  See Boyce & Pastor, supra note 2, at ix, 9-10, 38–41. Boyce and Pastor note 
that “the three industrial sectors for which carbon reduction may be the most important— power 
plants, refineries and chemical manufacturing . . . also have the most disproportionate impacts 
on minorities” in considering exposure to toxics and to fine particulate matter.  Id. at 39.  
For a list of studies documenting disproportionate exposure to industrial pollution, see 
Farber, supra note 1, at 26 n.106. 
 111.  See Boyce & Pastor, supra note 2, at 2. 
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power plant located in a rural area with 600 residents within a six-mile 
radius, and an oil refinery in Torrance, California with 800,000 residents, and 
many other polluting facilities, within a six-mile radius.  The oil refinery 
has a higher co-pollutant intensity than the natural gas facility– although 
both facilities emit the same levels of GHG gases, the oil refinery emits 350 
tons of particulates per year, in comparison with 50 tons per year of 
particulates from the natural gas facility. 
Given the greater exposed population, the higher co-pollutant intensity, 
and the presence of higher cumulative exposures, the co-pollutant risks 
and benefits at the Torrance facility are much greater than at the La Paloma 
power plant.  If the Torrance facility were to purchase GHG allowances 
that allowed it to increase emissions, its higher co-pollutant intensity (seven 
times more particulates per ton of GHGs) would lead to higher associated co-
pollutant emissions than would occur from similar allowance purchases at 
the power plant. Moreover, those co-pollutants would impact many more 
people (800,000 rather than 600 within a six-mile radius), and the 
impacted communities would already be exposed to higher baseline levels of 
pollution from cumulative sources.  Thus, a trading program that allows the 
refinery to maintain or increase emissions and that decreases emissions only 
at the power plant could exacerbate disparities in co-pollutant 
exposures. 
This is not to say that trading would inevitably lead to increases in co-
pollutants in environmental justice communities.  The federal Acid Rain 
Program, for example, did not intensify emissions in environmental justice 
communities.112  In addition, entities participating in the GHG trading 
program must still comply with co-pollutant control requirements.  
Nonetheless, existing air pollution control requirements have failed to 
achieve healthy air and the additional reductions achieved indirectly through 
climate policy would provide important new benefits.113 Moreover, existing 
regulations do not cover all pollutants; many air toxics are unregulated.114  
Nor do existing air pollution control requirements prevent all emissions 
 
 112.  See e.g., Jason Corburn, Emissions Trading and Environmental Justice: 
Distributive Fairness and the USA’s Acid Rain Programme, 28 ENVTL. CONSERVATION 
323 (2001); Kaswan, Climate Change, supra note 90, at 98–99. 
 113.  See Boyce & Pastor, supra note 2 at 14; Kaswan, Climate Change, supra note 
90, at 65–69. 
 114.  Boyce and Pastor report that less “than half of the chemicals reported in the 
USEPA’s annual Toxics Release Inventory . . . are subject to USEPA restrictions on point-
source emissions.”  Boyce & Pastor, supra note 2, at 13. 
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increases;115 they often control only the rate of pollution emissions, not 
their absolute quantity.116 
The key question is not just the co-pollutant implications of cap-and-
trade, but how they compare with other climate policy alternatives. The 
degree to which more traditional direct GHG regulations would constrain 
GHG and co-pollutant emissions increases would depend upon how they 
were designed. If direct GHG regulations imposed facility-specific caps 
on emissions, then they would not result in the associated co-pollutant 
increases that are possible in a cap-and-trade program.  If, instead, they 
were designed like many traditional air pollution controls, then they too 
would permit absolute GHG emissions increases (and co-pollutant increases) 
so long as the rate of GHG emissions per unit of production did not 
increase.117  Nonetheless, relative to a cap-and-trade approach, direct GHG 
regulation of GHG emissions rates would bring emissions to a lower baseline, 
and that would, in turn, lower the starting point for any subsequent increases 
in operations and emissions.118 
As or more importantly, environmental justice advocates seek to 
maximize co-pollutant reductions and their benefits, not simply prevent 
co-pollutant increases. A trading program does not ensure that emissions 
reductions occur where they are most needed: reductions in less polluted 
areas could enable allowance purchases that maintain emissions in more 
polluted areas, as would occur if the La Paloma plant reduced emissions 
and sold the allowances to the Torrance facility.  Further, a trading program 
does not facilitate those GHG reductions that provide the largest 
 
 115.  Increased emissions trigger regulatory review only when they reflect a 
modification to the facility that triggers “New Source Review” under the Clean Air Act, 
not when they reflect purely operational changes.  See Kaswan, Climate Change, supra 
note 90, at 98; see also Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic Climate 
Change Policy, 38 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,287, 10,299–301 (2008) (discussing risk of co-
pollutant increases). 
 116.  Most emission controls establish emission-rate limitations: the facility can emit only 
so much of a pollutant per unit of energy or product created.  Absolute emissions can 
increase as long as the rate of pollutant emissions does not increase. For criteria pollutants, 
some jurisdictions may, however, include absolute emissions limits in their state 
implementation plans to achieve national ambient air quality standards. 
 117.  Direct regulation would likely impose energy efficiency requirements that 
would lower the rate of GHG emissions per unit of energy or product created.  Facilities 
would become more efficient, lowering their baseline emissions.  Nonetheless, the emissions 
rate standard would not prevent them from increasing production, and increasing absolute 
emissions, so long as they comply with the relevant emissions rate limitation. 
 118.  As Professor Farber notes, regulators developing direct regulations take cost 
and feasibility into account and therefore are unlikely to establish uniform reduction 
requirements for differing kinds of facilities through direct regulation, so the risk of 
unequal reductions is present in traditional as well as market-based regulation.  Farber, supra 
note 1, at 28–29.  Nonetheless, unlike cap-and-trade, regulatory approaches would require at 
least some level of reduction at most emitting facilities. 
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associated co-pollutant benefits because facilities with low co-pollutant 
intensities, like natural gas fired power plants, could reduce emissions and 
thereby enable facilities with high co-pollutant intensities, like refineries, 
to continue their emissions.119 
Environmental justice advocates contend that the failure to maximize 
pollution reductions in the state’s most polluted areas could continue the 
legacy of unequal exposure.120  As the Environmental Justice Advisory 
Committee stated in a letter transmitting its comments on the final draft 
of the Proposed Scoping Plan: 
For urban areas of the state, the failure of ARB to include measures to reduce 
emissions from power plants, refineries, and other industrial sources means that 
ARB is turning its back on these severely negatively impacted communities.  
Allowing trading and offsets that will result in continued emissions in exchange 
for reductions (or tree preservation) elsewhere simply compounds the injury to 
these communities.”121 
Environmental justice advocates recommend that ARB “implement ARB’s 
goal to maximize co-pollutant reductions for all Industrial Sources including 
oil refineries [and] [p]rioritize direct, local control (not trading) [of] GHG 
 
 119.  As Boyce and Pastor state, in light of the evidence that refineries’ co-pollutant 
intensity is much higher, on average, than power plant co-pollutant intensity, “any 
carbon-charge system in which refineries en masse buy their way out of cleanup and let 
most of the carbon reduction come instead from power plants would forego significant 
health co-benefits.” Boyce & Pastor, supra note 2, at 27. In addition, in some cases there are 
substantial co-pollutant intensity variations within sectors that suggest that targeting emission 
reductions at the most polluting facilities within sectors could maximize benefits.  Id. at 
31–32. The variation is strong, for example, in the power plant sector, where coal-fired 
power plants have a much higher co-pollutant intensity than natural-gas fired power plants.  
Id. at 32 n.8. 
 120.  See Title VI Complaint, supra note 66, at 17–28 (describing potential disparate 
impact caused by California’s cap-and-trade program). The Title VI complaint relies 
heavily on data on the distribution of industry and demographic exposures reported in a 
study entitled: Minding the Climate Gap.  See Manuel Pastor et al., Minding the Climate 
Gap: What’s at Stake if California’s Climate Law Isn’t Done Right and Right Away, USC 
DORNSIFE COLLEGE OF LETTERS, ARTS, AND SCIENCES (2000), http://dornsife.usc.edu/ 
assets/sites/242/docs/mindingthegap.pdf. 
 121.  Letter from Angela Johnson Meszaros and Jane Williams, Co-Chairs, EJAC, to 
Mary Nichols, Chairman, CARB (Dec. 10, 2008), in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE, RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GLOBAL WARMING SOLUTIONS 
ACT OF 2006 (AB 32) ON THE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN (2008), available at http://www. 
arb.ca.gov/cc/ejac/proposedplan-ejaccommentsfinaldec10.pdf. 
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sources where co-pollutants are significant (including refineries and 
industrial sources).”122 
Offsets create an additional concern about the cap-and-trade program’s co-
pollutant implications. The use of offsets means that the covered sector 
will not make all of the reductions necessary to reach the cap; in-sector 
emissions will continue, having been “offset” by out-of-sector 
reductions.  As a consequence, regulated entities, including industry, electric 
utilities, and transportation fuels, the primary sources of California 
pollution, will not reduce co-pollutants to the extent they would without 
offsets,123 and the offset program will reduce the co-pollutant reduction 
benefits of the cap-and-trade program.  Moreover, offsets that meet 
California standards but are outside California qualify.  That means that 
offset benefits would be provided out-of-state, and possibly in other 
countries, while in-state pollution remains.124 
Offset projects may well produce their own environmental co-benefits, 
including better manure control on farms, protection of the ozone layer, 
urban and rural forestry protections, and, if and when international  
offsets are accepted, tropical forest conservation.  They are also designed 
 
 122.  EJAC 2008, supra note 22, at 40.  As an alternative, the EJAC recommended 
imposing a 33 percent emission reduction target on refineries and industrial sources as 
well as numerous additional control measures.  Id. at 41–42. 
 123.  Letter from EarthJustice to Cal. Air Res. Bd. (Aug. 6, 2013), available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ejac/meetings/080513/ejac-initial-recommendations-2013.pdf 
[hereinafter EarthJustice].  The Environmental Justice Advisory Committee, designed to 
inform AB 32 implementation, continues to advocate for limits on the use of offsets 
because they “could diminish direct emission reductions in disadvantaged communities.”  
THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO 
INFORM DEVELOPMENT OF THE 2013 UPDATE TO THE AB 32 SCOPING PLAN 5 (2013), 
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ejac/meetings/080513/ejac-initial-recommendations- 
2013.pdf [hereinafter EJAC 2013]. 
 124.  See EarthJustice, supra  note 123, at 2; Global Warming Law (AB32) Shifts 
Responsibility from Polluters to Communities, PODOMATIC (July 11, 2011), http://postcarbon. 
podomatic.com/entry/2013-08-24T15_12_10-07_00 (interviewing Brent Newell, General 
Counsel for the Center on Race, Poverty, and the Environment).  Environmental justice 
groups’ arguments are rooted in AB 32 provisions requiring ARB to design its emission 
reduction program to maximize co-benefits in California. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE, § 38501(West 2013) (reduction measures should “maximize[] environmental and 
economic co-benefits for California.”) (emphasis added). 
Although the four protocols adopted to date all envision domestic offsets, ARB has 
linked its program with Quebec, opening the door to offsets created in Quebec. ARB has 
also been working with international officials to develop potential forest conservation 
offsets derived from timber conservation in Mexico and Brazil. See Ramo, supra note 179, 
at 23.  In anticipation of international offsets, and to limit their role, ARB has promulgated 
regulations that will allow the use of international offsets in meeting individual entity 
compliance obligations, but limit their use to 2 percent of the permissible 8 percent in the 
first two compliance periods (through 2017) and to 4 percent of the permissible 8 percent 
in the last compliance period (ending in 2020).  Id. at 24. 
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to achieve economic benefits by lowering costs, a benefit that  favors 
low-income consumers.  The environmental justice community’s stance 
implicitly suggests that sacrificing co-pollutant reduction benefits to achieve 
offset project benefits is not an appropriate tradeoff. 
Clearly, opinions will differ on the relative importance of co-benefits 
from in-sector reductions versus the co-benefits from offset projects, and 
on the relative importance of obtaining in-state co-benefits.  The offset 
litigation, and the environmental justice challenges to offsets, put these 
issues squarely on the table. 
b.  Do Stationary Source Emissions Matter? 
Recent research by Prof. David Adelman has suggested that industrial 
toxic emissions are such a marginal component of most areas’ overall 
pollution burden that emissions shifts from a GHG cap-and-trade program 
would have a negligible impact on relative pollution levels.125  Accordingly, 
he argues, potential co-pollutant impacts should not stand as an obstacle 
to GHG pollution trading.126 While Prof. Adelman’s research provides 
important insights on the critical role that non-industrial sources play in 
toxic pollution, the distributional consequences of cap-and-trade remain 
relevant. 
First, the prevalence of non-industrial pollution sources does not 
mean that industrial source emissions are irrelevant.127  While changes in 
industrial emissions will not lead to dramatic percentage changes in 
absolute emissions levels when non-industrial sources constitute the 
primary contributors, those changes are nonetheless meaningful to 
impacted communities.128  An increase in industrial emissions does not 
become less harmful or significant just because there are already many 
 
 125.  David E. Adelman, The Collective Origins of Toxic Air Pollution: Implications for 
Greenhouse Gas Trading and Toxic Hotspots, 88 IND. L. J. 273, 321, 326 (2013). 
 126.  Adelman argues that tailored control mechanisms could be implemented in the 
few instances where GHG trading could make a significant difference in associated co-pollutant 
toxic emissions.  Id. at 327–30. 
 127.  See Alice Kaswan, GHG Trading and Co-Pollutants: Expanding the Focus, 
CPRBLOG (Sept. 9, 2013), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm? 
idBlog=038F9D48-C60E-14A7-E161BD89C2256287 [hereinafter Kaswan, GHG Trading 
and Co-Pollutants]. 
 128.  As Boyce and Pastor note, even if emission shifts appear to be “a ripple in a 
larger ocean of air pollution . . . one person’s ripple is another community’s wave.”  Boyce 
& Pastor, supra note 2, at vii. 
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other sources of industrial emissions.  And the potential to achieve decreases 
in industrial emissions does not become less important by virtue of the 
presence of many other sources.  A key factor in determining the value of 
pollution reductions is the overall need for reductions, not simply the relative 
percentage reduction that can be achieved.129 
Second, as Prof. Adelman acknowledges, most studies evaluate 
pollutant levels at the county or census tract level, and could therefore 
fail to reflect “microscale” localized concentrations.130  Few studies have 
monitored actual fenceline pollutant levels,131 and so Adelman uses 
emissions release data to predict potential microscale hotspots.  Although 
he identified numerous potential sources that could cause localized 
impacts,132 he ultimately concludes that his census tract and county level 
studies would capture the relevant impacts of a GHG trading program.133  
However, it is not clear that these larger-scale analyses sufficiently capture 
the highly localized and cumulative impacts that are of immediate relevance 
to environmental justice communities. 
Third, Prof. Adelman’s work concentrated on cancer risks from toxic 
emissions, not neurological risks from toxics or criteria pollutants.  While not 
a large component of cancer risk, Professors Boyce and Pastor suggest that 
industrial sources are a significant source of the nation’s neurological risk, 
particularly in census tracts facing the highest overall risk levels.134  
Moreover, stationary sources contribute significantly to criteria pollutant 
pollution, generating 95 percent of SO2 emissions (largely from coal-fired 
 
 129.  For example, a 2 percent reduction in emissions could be more important in a 
heavily polluted and densely populated area than a 10 percent reduction in a less polluted 
and less densely populated area.  See Kaswan, GHG Trading and Co-Pollutants, supra 
note 127. 
 130.  See Adelman, supra note 125, at 297, 300. 
 131.  The primary existing study was done in Corpus Christi, Texas, and showed 
relatively low localized emissions.  See id. at 301–02. 
 132.  With a threshold of twenty pounds per day of air toxics, Adelman predicts 1390 
facilities capable of generating microscale hot spots, focusing on OSHA carcinogens.  With 
a threshold of fifty pounds per day, he predicts 750 potential microscale hot spots.  Id. at 
302. Somewhat lower numbers are predicted using a different toxics test.  Id. 
 133.  Adelman concludes that many of the facilities do not have significant GHG 
emissions, and so trading would not have a large impact on associated co-pollutant levels.  Id. 
at 303. Furthermore, he suggests that those with significant GHG emissions would also be 
considered significant at the census tract level and are adequately addressed by his census-
tract-level data.  Id. 
 134.  See Boyce & Pastor, supra note 2, at 7–8.  Point sources contribute 23 percent 
of neurological risk in the census tracts facing the top 10 percent population risk and 
contribute 42 percent of neurological risk in the census tracts with the top 1 percent 
population risk.  Id. See Boyce & Pastor, supra note 2, at 7–8.  Point sources contribute 
23 percent of neurological risk in the census tracts facing the top 10 percent population 
risk and contribute 42 percent of neurological risk in the census tracts with the top 1 
percent population risk. Id. at 8 (Table 3). 
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power plants), 40 percent of NOx emissions, and 14 percent of fine 
particulate emissions.135  Thus, while mobile and area sources of toxics may 
marginalize the relative role of industrial toxic emissions in causing cancer, 
industrial emissions remain highly relevant to relative neurological toxics 
risks and exposure to criteria pollutant emissions.  Prof. Adelman’s work 
reveals the critical role of mobile and small sources to air toxics pollution, but 
does not obviate the need for attention to stationary source emissions. 
c. ARB’s Approach to Cap-and-Trade’s Distributional Consequences 
As noted above, environmental justice groups’ legal challenges to ARB’s 
analysis of the cap-and-trade program’s co-pollutant distributional impacts 
failed.  Although not subject to litigation, there are two additional pieces 
to the environmental justice story: ARB’s Adaptive Management Plan and 
a new law directing allowance auction proceeds to disadvantaged 
communities. 
ARB acknowledged the potential for localized increases in co-pollutant 
emissions and developed an Adaptive Management Plan to address that 
risk.136  Annually, the agency will monitor facility emissions, ambient air 
quality data, and facility plans to determine whether any emissions increases 
have or are likely to occur.137  The agency will then assess whether the 
increases are caused by the cap-and-trade program or, instead, are caused by 
factors such as economic growth, increased consumer demand, changing 
industry variables, or independent regulatory requirements.138  If the 
increase is caused by the cap-and-trade program, ARB will assess whether it 
will have an adverse localized effect.139  If the program causes an increase 
that has an adverse effect, then ARB will develop a response.140  The plan 
provides little detail on the nature of the response, and states only that it 
  
 
 135.  Id. at 8. 
 136.  Adaptive Management Plan for the Cap-and-Trade Regulation, CAL. AIR RES. 
BD., (Oct. 10, 2011), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/adaptive_management/ 
plan.pdf. 
 137.  Id. at 6–18. 
 138.  Id. at 24–25; 26–27. 
 139.  Id. at 25. 
 140.  Id. at 27–28. 
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could include the adoption of additional regulatory requirements, using funds 
obtained from the sale of allowances to support local mitigation projects, 
coordination with other agencies to provide additional incentives for energy 
efficiency or other emission reduction activities within the community, or 
modifications to the [Cap-and-Trade] Regulation.141 
In addition to the Adaptive Management Plan for the cap-and-trade 
program, the Air Resources Board, in conjunction with the overarching 
California Environmental Protection Agency and the Office of 
Environmental Health Hazard Assessment, is, as of this writing, exploring a 
new initiative to track the broader impacts of all AB 32 measures on 
environmental justice communities.142  This effort includes but is not 
limited to the data that would be gathered under the Adaptive Management 
Plan. 
Alegria de la Cruz, the Legal Director for the Center on Race, Poverty 
and the Environment, which has litigated the environmental justice cases, 
has argued that the Adaptive Management Plan “creates impossibly high 
hurdles for ARB to jump before it could take any action to protect people’s 
health as a result of increased emissions.”143  She argues that it will be 
very difficult for ARB to track emissions increases and to determine whether 
the cap-and-trade program, rather than some other factor, “caused” an 
emissions increase.144  The EJAC, in suggestions for the next Scoping 
Plan, has argued that “[t]he Adaptive Management Plan should provide 
for proactive solutions when unintended environmental justice impacts are 
discovered.”145  More fundamentally, the Adaptive Management Plan is 
narrowly tailored to addressing trade-induced emissions increases, and 
does not address the environmental justice advocates’ larger objective of 
maximizing co-pollutant reduction benefits. 
A long-standing environmental justice initiative to direct auction revenues 
to disadvantaged communities came to fruition in 2012 with the enactment 
of SB 535, which directs 25 percent of auction revenue to disadvantaged 
 
 141.  Id. at 27. 
 142.  Discussion Draft, Assessing the Effects of Climate Change Mitigation Programs 
in Environmental Justice Communities, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Oct. 21, 2013), 
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ejac/meetings/102213/tracking-indicators.pdf. 
 143.  Global Justice Ecology Project, “Cap-and-Trade Will Fail”: An Interview with 
Alegria de la Cruz of the Center on Race, Poverty and the Environment, CLIMATE 
CONNECTIONS (Nov. 16, 2011), available at http://climate-connections.org/2011/11/16/” 
cap-and-trade-will-fail”-an-interview-with-alegria-de-la-cruz-of-the-center-on-race-poverty- 
and-the-environment/. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  See EJAC 2013, supra note 123. 
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communities.146  The legislative findings acknowledged AB 32’s recognition 
of “the potential vulnerability of California’s low-income and disadvantaged 
population to efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,”147 and enacted SB 
535 to continue implementing AB 32 “by achieving additional emission 
reductions and mitigating direct health impacts on California’s most 
impacted and disadvantaged communities.”148 Disadvantaged communities 
will be identified based on “geographic, socioeconomic, public health, and 
environmental hazard criteria,” including areas experiencing disproportionate 
pollution burdens and areas that have low socioeconomic indicators.149  
Ten percent of the proceeds must be invested directly in the targeted 
communities; the remaining 15 percent need not be directly invested, but 
must accrue to the communities’ benefit.150  While the funds are not directly 
linked to mitigating co-pollutant burdens, such mitigation is one possible 
use for the funds. 
ARB’s Adaptive Management Plan and the auction revenue flow to 
environmental justice communities do not appear to have allayed 
environmental justice concerns about the cap-and-trade program, at least 
in rhetoric.  Nonetheless, at present, environmental justice communities 
are continuing to participate in AB 32 implementation on a variety of 
fronts, and it is unclear whether they will take additional steps to oppose 
cap-and-trade. 
3.  Community Participation in Facility Emissions Decisions 
Along with distributional justice, participatory justice is a core 
environmental justice theme.151 A profound difference between market-
based and traditional regulatory approaches is that traditional approaches 
provide a greater role for government and communities in facility emissions 
decisions than market-based mechanisms. 
Under traditional regulatory approaches, the public can engage in the 
threshold regulatory process as the agency establishes basic program 
requirements.  Thereafter, the public has the opportunity to engage in public 
 
 146.  See Legis. Counsel’s Digest, S.B. 535, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012), 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billSearchClient.xhtml (search for bill number 535, with 
session year set as “2011-2012,” and with house set as “Senate”; follow hyperlink “SB-535”). 
 147.  Id. § 1(b). 
 148.  Id. § 1(h). 
 149.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39711 (2013). 
 150.  Id. § 39713(b). 
 151.  See Kaswan, Domestic Adaptation, supra note 1, at 10, 302–03. 
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hearings in facility-specific permitting proceedings.  Although local 
communities cannot control permitting, facility-specific public hearings 
provide an opportunity for affected communities to become informed 
about and offer their input on proposed facility operations. These permit 
proceedings give community members the opportunity to directly engage the 
facilities in their midst, providing some measure of informal 
accountability even in the absence of direct legal control. 
Market-based regulatory approaches provide opportunities for public 
input at the threshold regulatory level; the public can comment on cap-
and-trade rules, offset rules, and other program parameters. However, cap- 
and-trade and other market-based mechanisms allow individual facilities 
substantial flexibility to make autonomous emissions decisions.  Facilities 
must report their emissions and demonstrate that they hold sufficient 
compliance instruments to cover their emissions, but there is no public 
process for determining the level of emissions or the steps they will take 
to reduce emissions.152  Facilities have full autonomy to reduce GHG 
emissions or purchase compliance instruments without prior consultation 
with government or community members.153  As environmental justice 
advocates have stated: “Trading is undemocratic, secretive, and excludes 
the public from decisionmaking about whether and how to address 
greenhouse gas emissions.”154 The participation deficit should not be 
 
 152.  AB 32 requires GHG emissions reporting.  See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 38530. Every three years, covered entities must show that they hold sufficient allowances to 
cover the preceding three years’ emissions.  On an annual basis, they must show that they 
have accumulated allowances to cover at least 30 percent of the preceding year’s 
emissions.  See Brisson et al., supra note 28, at 4. 
 153.  Similarly, in a carbon tax context, facilities can autonomously decide whether 
to reduce emissions or pay the tax. 
 154.  The Cap-and-Trade Charade for Climate Change, EJ MATTERS, www.ejmatters. 
org/docs/Reasons.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2014) [hereinafter EJ Matters, Cap-and-Trade 
Charade]. In a declaration against cap-and-trade by environmental justice groups, the 
groups assert that “carbon trading is undemocratic because it allows entrenched polluters, 
market designers, and commodity traders to determine whether and where to reduce 
greenhouse gases and co-pollutant emissions without allowing impacted communities or 
governments to participate in those decisions.”  The California Environmental Justice 
Movement’s Declaration on Use of Carbon Trading Schemes to Address Climate 
Change, EJ MATTERS, http://www.ejmatters.org/declaration.html (last visited Dec. 11, 
2013). Professor Sean Hecht suggests that the lack of community input in trading programs 
“may be the EJ community’s most fundamental objection to trading programs.” See Sean 
Hecht, Reflections on Environmental Justice and AB 32’s Emissions Trading Program, 
Legal Planet (Mar. 23, 2011), http://legal-planet.org/2011/03/23/reflections-on-environmental- 
justice-and-ab-32s-emissions-trading-program/. Prof. Hecht observes that “[i]t is a core 
belief of EJ advocates that a process lacking in community engagement at the project or 
plant level cannot lead to a sustainable long-term set of solutions to the environmental 
inequities they are trying to eradicate,” even if the policies in question provide environmental 
justice benefits.  Id.  
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overstated: to the degree that GHG allowance decisions implicate associated 
co-pollutants in ways that trigger the need for permit modifications, the 
public could indirectly become involved.  Nonetheless, many GHG 
decisions, because they concern the degree of reductions, not potential 
increases, will not trigger co-pollutant permitting processes and will 
therefore occur without public participation. 
Market-based mechanisms’ industrial autonomy is an advantage from 
both government and industry viewpoints: the government does not have 
to assess operational options and negotiate permits, and industry does not 
have to engage in time- and resource-intensive permitting processes.  
From a community perspective, however, industry autonomy comes at the 
expense of participation. 
B.  Effectiveness 
The environmental justice community’s opposition to cap-and-trade has 
not only been rooted in core environmental justice concerns, but has 
reflected deep critiques of the effectiveness of cap-and-trade—of its 
capacity to succeed in reducing GHGs and creating incentives  for 
fundamental shifts in our energy, industrial, and land use infrastructure.  
In fact, the California environmental justice movement’s support of a 
climate fee, another market-based mechanism that poses all of the 
distributional and participatory challenges of cap-and-trade, can be at least 
partly explained by the environmental justice groups’ belief that a fee 
would be a more effective mechanism for reducing emissions than cap-
and-trade.155  Moreover, the environmental justice groups’ belief that cap-
and-trade is completely dysfunctional helps explain why environmental 
justice groups brought the lawsuits, notwithstanding their deep concern 
 
 155.  See Theory vs. Reality, Debunking the Myths of Cap-and-Trade, EJ MATTERS, 
http://www.ejmatters.org/docs/GHG-Myths_FactsheetFINAL[1].pdf at 6–7 [hereinafter 
Theory vs. Reality, Debunking the Myths of Cap-and-Trade]. This is not to say that a 
carbon fee (or, in ordinary parlance, a carbon tax) would be more effective than cap-and-
trade; that is a larger issue beyond the scope of this essay.  Other likely reasons for 
environmental justice groups’ support of a tax over cap-and-trade likely relate to deeper 
structural differences between cap-and-trade and taxes.  A cap-and-trade program gives 
facilities an opportunity to profit from the sale of allowances and otherwise reap the value 
of allowances.  Philosophically, environmental justice groups balk at a pollution control 
system that becomes a profit-making opportunity for polluting businesses.  A tax, in 
contrast, requires polluters to “pay” for their pollution and ensures that the taxpayers receive 
the full economic value. 
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about GHG emissions. Years before bringing suit, they had already stated the 
principle that “Doing Something Dysfunctional Is Not Better than Doing 
Nothing at All.”156 
1.  Stringency 
The capacity of a cap-and-trade program to lead to real emissions 
reductions depends entirely upon the stringency of the cap.  If a cap is 
stringent enough, then the number of allowances distributed will be less 
than actual emissions and the regulated sectors will have to reduce their 
emissions.  If the cap is not stringent enough, then the number of 
allowances in the system could equal or even exceed actual emissions.  
Under these circumstances, the cap-and-trade program will fail to lead to 
actual emissions reductions.157 Environmental justice advocates point to 
“lax cap” problems in existing GHG trading programs, including the 
European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme158 and the northeastern states 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative for reducing GHGs from the power 
sector.159 
Although traditional direct regulatory mechanisms do not set absolute 
emissions levels and could lead to emissions increases when production 
levels increase, they, unlike a cap-and-trade program, ensure that GHG 
emission rates are being reduced regardless of the level of economic 
activity.  Similarly, although a carbon tax does not guarantee a certain level 
of reductions, it will continue to send a market signal for emissions reduction, 
whatever the state of the economy. This is not to say that either direct 
 
 156.  Id. at 5. 
 157.  Environmental justice advocates have noted that insufficiently stringent caps 
result in “over-supply of permits, low credit prices, and no reductions in the amount of 
pollution released.”  EJ MATTERS, Cap-and-Trade Charade, supra note 154, at 1. 
 158.  See Theory vs. Reality: Debunking the Myths of Cap-and-Trades, supra note 
155, at 1. For more information on the ETS’ lax cap in the first phase of the program, see 
Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving Toward 
Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 411–12 (2009). With the economic recession in 
2008, the ETS surplus has worsened and, at present, the ETS anticipates a surplus of 
allowances over emissions throughout the 3rd phase of the program, through 2020.  See 
European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council: The State of the European Carbon Market in 2012 4–6 (2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/reform/docs/com_2012_652_en.pdf. 
 159.  See Theory vs. Reality: Debunking the Myths of Cap-and-Trade, supra note 
155, at 2; see also JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,  R41836, THE REGIONAL 
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE: LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR POLICYMAKERS 5–7 (2013) 
(describing how the RGGI cap has been substantially higher than actual emissions). The 
RGGI states have agreed in principle to reduce the cap substantially going forward. Id. 
Each state in the program must implement the new cap through state-level adjustments to 
state programs. Id. 
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regulations or carbon taxes are inherently more stringent; each system 
presents its own risks of insufficient stringency.  Nonetheless, cap-and-
trade alternatives avoid the specific risk of a lax cap. 
The risks of a lax cap are most evident when caps are based on inflated 
projections based on either past or expected future emissions. Because 
California’s cap is derived from the legislatively-set goal to attain 1990 
emissions levels by 2020, it avoids the risk, experienced in the European 
Emissions Trading System, of basing the cap on overestimates of future 
emissions. Nonetheless, the most recent projections for California suggest a 
lax cap: the number of available allowances, combined with offsets, is 
expected to exceed the level of actual emissions throughout most of the 
life of the program.160  Analysts attribute the low level of existing and 
projected emissions to the economic recession and the effectiveness of 
the state’s complementary reduction measures (like the Renewable Portfolio 
Standard and auto emission standards).161  The low level of existing 
emissions, coupled with the availability of offsets, is likely to result in little 
demand for allowances (and few program-induced emission reductions) 
through 2020.162  The California program will partially constrain the effects 
of oversupply through a price floor mechanism.  If allowance prices fall 
below the price floor, that mechanism will withhold allowances from 
quarterly auctions, effectively lowering the short-term cap.163 
California’s cap, and the cap-and-trade program, may therefore do 
relatively little to achieve emission reductions in California; other programs 
appear to be generating most of the emissions reductions. That does not 
mean the cap-and-trade program is useless.  The price floor maintains a 
modest price signal, and the cap acts as a backstop to achieve the state’s 
reduction goals if, in the end, the complementary measures fail to 
 
 160.  See Press Release, Thomson Reuters, Thomson Reuters Point Carbon Lowers 
California Carbon Price Forecast by Two Thirds (Sept. 10, 2013), available at http://www. 
pointcarbon.com/aboutus/pressroom/pressreleases/1.2562573. Point Carbon analysts state that 
California emissions are likely to “remain[] below the allowance cap until at least 2017 with 
offsets subsequently making the market oversupplied through 2019.” Id. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  The price floor for 2012 was $10/ton, and rises by 5 percent over inflation each 
year.  See CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE 
PROGRAM SUMMARY 3 (2013), available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/calif-cap-
trade-01-13.pdf.  Unsold allowances, withheld to maintain the price floor, are placed in an 
ARB “auction holding account” and sold (to a limited degree) in later auctions.  See 
Brisson, et al., supra note 28, at 2910–11. In that way, the number of available allowances will 
not exceed emissions, retaining at least some incentive for reductions. 
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sufficiently reduce emissions or if renewed economic growth causes 
unanticipated emissions increases.  Nonetheless, environmental justice 
advocates have highlighted the challenge of creating a cap that itself drives 
real reductions. 
2.  Innovation and Transformative Incentives 
A weak cap-and-trade program could interfere with another central 
climate policy goal: generating transformative incentives.  While a stringent 
cap would create strong transformative incentives, a weak cap would not 
only fail to reduce emissions, as noted above, but also lead to low allowance 
and offset prices that would fail to create a market signal for investing in 
energy efficiency or developing innovative technologies.164  California’s 
price floor prevents the price from bottoming out, but it is an open question 
whether having allowances prices at the price floor, as is anticipated 
throughout most of the program, will induce investment and development in 
low-carbon alternatives.165 
Moreover, environmental justice advocates argue that a cap-and-trade 
program’s price volatility could hamper innovative investments.  While 
cap-and-trade programs are intended to offer relative certainty about 
emissions levels, they do not offer price certainty: prices can fluctuate with 
the supply of and demand for allowances.  California’s  cap-and-trade 
program includes a price floor and price ceiling to control extremes, but it 
nonetheless permits a certain degree of variation. Environmental justice 
groups allege that that volatility deters investment because developers want 




 164.  Analysts suggest that the RGGI program’s lax cap and low allowance prices 
have failed to induce emissions reductions, although the allowance auctions have generated at 
least a slight carbon price.  See Ramseur, supra note 159, at 7. The European ETS’ low 
allowance prices have reportedly failed to discourage the development of coal-fired power.  See 
Carbon Trading ETS, RIP?, The Economist (Apr. 20, 2013). 
 165.  Allowance prices are likely to remain at the price floor because analysts predict that 
the number of allowances, plus available offsets, will exceed the cap throughout most of 
the life of the program, generating little demand for allowance purchases.  See supra note 
160 and accompanying text. 
 166.  See EJ MATTERS, Cap-and-Trade Charade, supra note 154; EJ MATTERS, 
Continuing to Debunk the Myths of Cap-and-Trade, Round 2, EJMATTERS.ORG, 
http://www.ejmatters.org/ (last visited Mar. 2009). 
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3.  Market Manipulation, Fraud, and Windfall Profits 
Environmental justice groups also fear that corporate players could 
manipulate markets.167  They fear that participants could hoard allowances, 
creating an artificial shortage, and then sell them when allowance prices 
are high.  Recognizing these risks, California regulators have attempted 
to prevent market manipulation through controls on allowance purchases 
and the allowance auction process.168 
The potential for corporate windfall profits, gained at the expense of 
consumers, have been another environmental justice concern.169  In the 
European ETS, utilities subject to the program were given allowances for free 
but nonetheless responded to the program by raising consumer energy prices, 
generating millions in company profits while consumers faced higher 
energy prices.170  California has attempted to reduce the risk of such profits 
in its program.  Like in the ETS, California is providing allowances to 
utilities for free.  However, California is requiring utilities to use the 
allowance value for consumer benefits.171 
 
 167.  See EJ MATTERS, Cap-and-Trade Charade, supra note 154, at 1 (noting Los 
Angeles Times’ report that the opportunities for profit presented by a trading program 
“presents opportunities for Enron-style market manipulation”); Theory vs. Reality: Debunking 
the Myths of Cap-and-Trade, supra note 155, at 2–3. 
 168.  ARB has established “holding limits” that restrict the number of compliance 
instruments that regulated entities are allowed to hold at any one time.  Brisson et al., 
supra note 28, at 4. The ARB regulations also limit the percentage of total allowances that 
any one entity can purchase at the quarterly auctions.  See id. at 5. 
 169.  See EJMatters, Cap-and-Trade Charade, supra note 154. 
 170.  See CHRISTIAN EGENHOFER ET AL., CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, 
THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM AND CLIMATE POLICY TOWARDS 2050: REAL 
INCENTIVES TO REDUCE EMISSIONS AND DRIVE INNOVATION? 14–16 (2011), available at 
http://www.ceps.eu/ceps/dld/4097/pdf (describing windfall profits in the European Union). 
 171.  More specifically, California will distribute allowances to utilities for free, but 
then require them to submit the allowances for sale at the state’s quarterly allowance 
auctions.  Sale proceeds must then be dedicated to ratepayer benefit.  Brisson et al., supra 
note 28. The California Public Utilities Commission has specified that 85 percent of the 
proceeds should be returned to residential customers in the form of rate reductions or 
climate dividends, and that the remaining 15 percent can go to small businesses and 
industries facing strong competition.  See Carolyn Whetzel, Residential Consumers Get 
Most of the Revenue from Utilities’ Sale of Cap-Trade Allowances, 44 ENVT REP. 57 (Jan. 
4, 2013); see also CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, ALJ/UNC/JHE/ AVS/GD2, 
DECISION ADOPTING CAP-AND-TRADE GREENHOUSE GAS ALLOWANCE REVENUE 
ALLOCATION METHODOLOGY FOR THE INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES (2012), available 
at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M039/K594/39594673.PDF. 
KASWAN(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE) 10/6/2016  8:29 AM 
 
40 
4.  Offsets and Program Effectiveness 
As discussed above, the environmental lawsuits against  the offset 
program challenge the agency’s methodology for determining whether 
offsets are “additional,” and, ultimately question the program’s integrity.  
Critics have raised other concerns about the offset program’s integrity as 
well.  For example, particularly in the forestry context, there are many 
questions about how to measure projected carbon sequestration.172  
Moreover, trees planted for urban forestry projects must be maintained 
and monitored for 100 years,173 a timeframe far outside the scope of most 
regulatory obligations and likely to be difficult to enforce. The forestry 
context raises yet another concern: leakage; that is, that conservation of 
one area will simply lead to logging elsewhere, generating no “additional” 
reductions.174  In addition, if the current planning process for forest offsets 
from Brazil and Mexico generates acceptable international offsets, advocates 
fear that the projects will lack integrity, undermine indigenous rights, and 
be inadequately monitored and enforced.175 
The integrity of offsets has significant implications for the integrity of 
the cap-and-trade program because offsets can be used to cover a significant 
percentage of the total expected reductions from the program. Covered 
facilities can use offsets to fulfill up to 8 percent  of their compliance 
obligation—to cover up to 8 percent of their total emissions.176  Focusing on 
the extent to which offsets can be used to offset required emissions 
reductions, the percentage is much larger, with estimates ranging up to 85 
percent.177 The extent to which offsets could substitute for reductions in 
 
 172.  See e.g., JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34436, THE ROLE OF 
OFFSETS IN A GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM: POTENTIAL BENEFITS 
AND CONCERNS 19–20 (2009). 
 173.  See Citizens Climate Lobby, slip op. at 16 (describing longevity requirement in 
Urban Forest Protocol). 
 174.  See Ramseur, supra note 172, at 16. 
 175.  See Letter from Activist San Diego, et al., to Governor Jerry Brown and ARB 
Chair Mary Nichols, (July 10, 2012), available at libcloud.s3.amazonaws.com/93/ca/b/2271/ 
Letter_to_Governor_and_ARB_re_CA_REDD_final.pdf. 
 176.  See Chapter 6: What Are the Requirements for Offset Credits and How Are 
They Issued?, CAL. AIR RES. BD., (Dec. 19, 2012), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/ 
cc/capandtrade/offsets/chapter6.pdf. 
 177.  The New York Times reported an ARB official’s acknowledgement that, under 
certain scenarios, offsets could cover up to 85 percent of all anticipated reductions.  See 
Anne C. Mulkern, Offsets Could Make up 85% of Calif.’s Cap-and-Trade Program, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011. The Environmental Defense Fund contests this assertion, arguing 
that it rests upon unrealistic assumptions about the practical operation of the program and 
that in-sector reductions are more likely than full use of allowable offsets.  See The Role 
of Offsets in California’s Cap-and-Trade Regulation, Frequently Asked Questions, 
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND (Apr. 2012), http://www.edf.org/sites/default/ 
files/OffsetsPercentagesFAQFinal%20041612.pdf. 
KASWAN(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE) 10/6/2016  8:29 AM 
[VOL. 5:  1, 2013–14]  Climate Change and Environmental Justice 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
 41 
the covered sectors is a complex and highly contested issue beyond the 
scope of this essay.  Nonetheless, it is worth noting that some estimates go so 
far as to suggest that facilities could cover all the reductions required by the 
cap-and-trade program itself using offsets.178  Under this scenario, the 
covered sectors would make real reductions as a consequence of 
complementary measures like the Renewable Portfolio Standard, the low-
carbon fuel standard, auto standards, consumer efficiency standards and 
other complementary measures, but the reductions to be induced 
exclusively by the cap-and-trade program could all be covered by offsets 
rather than met through in-sector reductions.179  Whatever the precise 
percentage, the debate makes clear that offsets could play a large role and 
that any defects in their integrity could have significant impacts on the 
integrity of the cap-and-trade program as a whole.180 
V.  CONCLUSION 
What legacy will the environmental justice challenges to AB 32 provide?  
Will the lawsuits engender enduring resentment and harden divisions 
among those working to address climate change?  Or will they focus 
public attention on critical issues, like co-pollutants and the efficacy of 
alternative climate policies?  Whatever one’s views on the legal merits or 
political wisdom of the environmental justice litigation, the lawsuits 
provide an opportunity to deepen our awareness of the connections 
 
 178.  See Maureen Nandini Mitra & Michael Stoll, California’s Market for Hard-to-
Verify Carbon Offsets Could Let Industry Pollute as Usual, EARTH ISLAND J. (July 3, 
2012), http://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/ elist/eListRead/californias_market_for_ 
carbon_offsets_could_let_industry_pollute_as_usual/. Researchers suggest that offsets 
could represent “anywhere from 53 percent to 224 percent of required carbon reductions, 
measured cumulatively through the year 2020.”  See id. 
 179.  Prof. Alan Ramo explains that the allowance budget for 2020 will be 334.2 
MMTCO2E. Eight percent of that total, the amount that could be covered by offsets, is 
26.7 MMTCO2E. At the same time, ARB’s current estimate for the emissions reductions 
to be achieved by the cap-and-trade program alone (and not induced by complementary 
measures) by 2020 is 18 MMTCO2E.  Thus, all of the emissions reductions projected to 
be reduced by the cap-and-trade program itself could be covered by offsets.  See Alan 
Ramo, The California Offset Game: Who Wins and Who Loses, 20 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. 
ENV. L. & POL’Y 109, 127–29 (2014). 
 180.  See Mitra & Stoll, supra note 178 (quoting Brian Nowicki, California climate 
policy director for the Center for Biological Diversity, who states that: “‘The integrity of 
the offsets is the integrity of the cap-and-trade program, because of how strongly the program 
is relying on them’”). 
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between climate policy and pollution, and provide a reminder to continually 
monitor the effectiveness of critical climate change programs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
